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A Review of Economic Dual-Self Modelling
Abstract
Dual-self decision theory generalises the canonical economic model by admitting
multiple, possibly conflicting, decision criteria. A typical dual-self model will for-
malise psychological or neuroscientific descriptions of the human decision-making
process into an economic model of that process, and apply that model to provide
an unified explanation for several behavioural anomalies. In this paper, we com-
pare the foundations of Neoclassical and dual-self decision theories, we develop a
generalised decision framework that nests both decision theories, and we use that
framework to provide a comprehensive taxonomy of the economic dual-self litera-
ture. We also discuss the relative merits of each existing dual-self approach, and
suggest avenues for future research.
Keywords: Dual-Self, Dual Self, Decision Theory, Behavioural
JEL Codes: D01, D91, D81, B41
1 Introduction
The first economic dual-self model was developed by Thaler and Shefrin, and published
in 1981. Their insight was that several aspects of consumer behaviour could be explained
by attributing to each individual two distinct entities: a ‘planner’ who seeks to maximise
lifetime utility, and a ‘doer’ who seeks to maximise present period utility. Those dual
selves embody the same quintessential human conflict between deliberative and impulsive
motivations that underlies much of the current dual-self literature, although there is now
substantial variation in the operationalisation of that conflict. In this paper we survey the
assumptions, the applications, and the implications from a large portion of the economic
dual-self literature, and in doing so we extend substantially the existing selective review
of Brocas & Carrillo (2014a).
Our review identifies five distinct modelling approaches within the literature. Accord-
ingly, we taxonomise existing studies into Tables 1, 2a,b, 3 and 4, in order to analyse
the achievements, the limitations, and the future potential of each approach in Section
3.2. Our analysis exposes a distinct disparity between the implications of those various
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modelling approaches, however it also enables us to identify a single, generalised, deci-
sion framework that has the potential to bring together many of those disparate strands
of the literature. Our generalised decision framework: nests the traditional ‘single-self’
paradigm; encompasses the majority of existing dual-self models as special cases; and is
also closely aligned with the psychological and neuroscientific literatures as distilled by
Evans & Stanovich (2013) and Bechara (2005). We present the generalised framework in
Section 3.1, and we conclude that it provides a promising direction for future research.
Traditional Expected Utility Theory is founded upon the principle that all outcomes
must admit one unique utility valuation. In contrast, our generalised decision framework
allows utility to be vector-valued. Section 2 compares the foundational assumptions and
implications of traditional Expected Utility Theory with those of our generalisation. In
doing so we determine a priori that the more mathematically elegant ‘single-self’ ap-
proach should be favoured in situations characterised by a single clear objective such as
profit maximisation, but that the more general dual-self approach should be favoured in
situations characterised by multiple, conflicting, motivations. Our discussion in Section 2
is reminiscent of those in classic texts such as Marshall’s (1890) Principles of Economics,
except that, where Marshall concluded that economic analysis can only be applied in
circumstances with monetarily quantifiable motivations, we conclude that circumstances
with diverse behavioural motivations could become tractable under our generalised de-
cision framework. For the reader who wishes to focus on existing implementations of
dual-self theory, Section 2 may be passed over: A holistic summary and conclusion is
provided in Section 4.
2 The Foundations of Dual-Self Theory
The dual-self paradigm for human decision-making is well-established in the psychological
literature, widely supported by neuroscience, and increasingly recognised as a valuable
approach to economic modelling1. Where Neoclassical models assume a single functional
form for decision utility, dual-self models specify multiple utility functions each of which
operationalises one possible decision criterion, or way-of-thinking. That generalisation
provides a descriptive theory of human action under multiple motivations, without requir-
ing those motivations to be directly comparable. This section will outline the strengths
and limitations of Neoclassical economic modelling, and explain the ways in which its
dual-self generalisation can overcome some of those limitations. A thorough discussion
of the restrictions required by the Neoclassical approach can be found in the opening
chapters of either Marshall (1890) or Von Mises (1949).
The Neoclassical decision framework provides both an elegant normative theory and
an intuitively appealing descriptive theory of human decision-making – for any situation
which is naturally characterised by a single objective function. Traditional economic
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problems, such as profit maximisation, are therefore well served by the canonical theory.
However, modern behavioural economics applies that same theory to situations charac-
terised by multiple, conflicting, motivations. Such applications of expected utility theory
imply that those diverse motivations can be completely represented by their image under
some hypothetical projection onto a single utility dimension, yet that cardinal conceptu-
alisation of utility has been widely discredited for over a century.
Cardinal Utilitarianism, as proposed by Bentham (1789), declares that individuals
should, and often do, act deliberately to maximise their predicted utility. Conversely,
modern utility theory is founded on the observation that, since individuals have pref-
erences, they act as though they were maximising some decision utility function. That
observation was formalised by Samuelson (1938) under the revealed preference paradigm,
and derived by von Neumann & Morgenstern (1947) under their axiomatisation of Ex-
pected Utility Theory. A concise statement of their result is that every outcome must
admit a well-defined decision utility valuation. Where Bentham postulated this founda-
tional result2, von Neumann-Morgenstern, Savage (1954), and others have derived it from
more primitive axioms. Nevertheless, any such axiomatisation necessarily requires human
action to manifest complete, transitive, and consistent preferences – an assumption set
which is frequently contradicted by observed behaviour (Rabin 2002).
The Neoclassical decision framework therefore faces challenges to both its intuitive
and its theoretical validity in non-catallactic situations. Nevertheless, the critical limita-
tion of that framework is that it can only describe a somewhat particular decision-making
mechanism: Homo economicus always weighs up her various motivations through con-
cious deliberation. Homo sapiens frequently do not (Smith 1759)3. Furthermore, when-
ever agents are modelled as though they were utility maximisers, their decision-making
processes are being described as a black box. Thus the canonical model provides a de-
scriptive theory of only the outcome from behavioural decisions, whilst it is the decision
mechanism which is of central interest in the design of policy or interventions.
Despite its limitations, there are at least three key applications for which the Neo-
classical decision framework is ideally suited. First, by prescribing a unique functional
form as its representative agent’s objective, the canonical model identifies its agent’s nor-
matively optimal response to any accurately operationalised situation. This application
of economic theory is precisely the science of Praxeology proposed by Von Mises (1949).
Second, the canonical model aptly describes the process of deliberative decision-making,
in circumstances where “the advantages and disadvantages of any particular action” may
be “reckoned-up”. This is precisely the restricted domain for which Marshall (1890, p.17)
expounded his Principles of Economics. Third, through ad-hoc adaptations of the util-
ity function, the canonical theory can provide tractable as if characterisations of many
non-pecuniary motivations. Such as if characterisations provide remarkably accurate
predictions of behavioural outcomes for particular decision situations (Crawford, Costa-
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Gomes & Iriberri 2013, Kosfeld et al. 2017).
The novelty of dual-self theory is that it explicitly models the interaction between
conflicting decision criteria. That approach can produce an unified explanation of diverse
behavioural anomalies, and can simultaneously suggest mechanisms for the processes of
human decision-making. Section 3 assesses the contributions of existing dual-self theory
toward each of these objectives.
Progress toward these objectives has been substantial. For example Fudenberg &
Levine (2006) provide an unified explanation for present-bias, the effect of orthogonal
cognitive load on decision outcomes, and the paradox of risk aversion in the large and the
small (ex Rabin 2000). Additional behavioural anomalies, such as the effects of framing,
priming, habit, and one’s current emotional state can equally be understood if they cue
certain decision criteria (Bernheim & Rangel 2004), or if they modulate the strength
of impulsive motivations (Loewenstein, O’Donoghue & Bhatia 2015). Furthermore, the
foundational principle of dual-self models, that every outcome must admit a well-defined
utility valuation in each of two dimensions, is, in a precise sense, the weakest generalisa-
tion of the canonical foundation that can predict temporal inconsistency (which in turn
predicts intransitivities).
The power of dual-self theories to provide unified explanations for behavioural anoma-
lies is derived from the hypothesis that each anomaly may represent a special case of some
single, fundamental, anomaly of human behaviour: specifically the tendency of individu-
als to act against their own long-term self-interest (Baumeister 2003). That hypothesis
suggests that each such anomaly may be rooted in the quintessential human conflict be-
tween deliberative and impulsive motivations; a conflict which is naturally operationalised
by dual-self theory. Indeed, almost the whole literature synthesised in Tables 1-4 models
that same quintessential conflict, although it is described in various alternative terminolo-
gies4. The various, approximately synonymous, terms adopted by those papers reflect the
idiosyncrasies of their respective models, which are frequently motivated by one particular
psychological, experimental, or neuroscientific characterisation of decision-making.
This paper will not reproduce the well-established evidence base for the dual-self
paradigm; instead the reader is referred to several prominent papers which have exposed
the pervasive importance of admitting multiple, possibly conflicting, decision criteria in
order to understand observed behaviours. Loewenstein (1996) provides an excellent gen-
eral discussion and characterisation of the visceral impulses which affect human decision-
making, Cohen (2005) describes the neuroscientific and evolutionary validation of that
characterisation, and Schelling (1984) discusses its implications for optimal self-control
behaviour in diverse situations.
Most existing dual-self models focus on a rational agent’s optimal response to the
quintessential human conflict, under the assumption that deliberative selves have com-
plete information regarding both the existence of, and the optimisation problem of, each
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alternative decision criterion. Whilst that assumption provides valuable insights, it is
“clearly unrealistic” (Brocas & Carrillo 2003, p.xviii). That assumption also implicitly
maintains the Neoclassical requirement that the population can be adequately described
by the singular utility formulation of some hypothetical representative agent. One alter-
native assumption would be to specify that each individual’s deliberative self will override
their impulsive self with a probability drawn from some individual- and situation-specific
distribution. This alternative assumption forms the basis of the generalised decision
theory set out in Section 3.1, which nest the models of Tables 1-4 as progressively less
restrictive special cases. The final model listed in Table 4 (Embrey 2017) applies the
fully generalised decision theory to provide an elementary understanding of the human
life-course, under which divergent human-capital outcomes result from heterogeneity in
ways-of-thinking.
The novelty of the generalised decision theory is that it describes a process of human
decision-making. That descriptive theory could be reduced to a normative theory by
stipulating which singular decision criterion its agents should apply. As an illustrative
example, consider the everyday decisions which determine individuals’ educational, em-
ployment, and health outcomes – for example whether to: do homework, attend class,
actively seek employment, exercise or watch t.v., cook or order a take-away,...5 These
decisions manifest the quintessential human conflict between deliberative and impulsive
reasoning, wherein a normative theory is provided by the imposition of some functional
form by which future consequences should be traded off against present desires. Note
that the implementation of such a trade-off itself requires deliberative thinking, whence
Neoclassical decision theory cannot describe heterogeneity in thought processes.
The canonical theory therefore provides three candidate mechanisms by which indi-
viduals could make normatively poor decisions: i. their estimated likelihood of future
consequences may be too low, ii. their estimated payoffs from those future consequences
may be too small, or iii. those future payoffs may be too heavily discounted. Under the
generalised model there is an additional candidate mechanism: iv. individuals may have
a positive probability of acting without evaluating the future consequences of their ac-
tion. The distinction between mechanisms iii. and iv. is substantive. The former implies
that, except for chance occurrences, individuals deliberatively choose their own socio-
economic outcomes, whereas the latter implies that those outcomes are an unintended
consequence of individuals’ socially-determined ways-of-thinking. The latter hypothesis
has been firmly adopted in the health inequalities literature, where unhealthy decisions
are considered to be a product of socio-economic determinants rather than individual
choice (Graham 2007, Watt 2007).
The generalised decision theory therefore provides significant new insights for any
situation where the probability of unconsidered action is non-negligible. A wide class
of situations are likely to satisfy that condition: certainly every person has, on occa-
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sion, acted without first considering the consequences of that action, and it may even
be that such occasions outnumber their complement. Furthermore, there are particular
situations, such as youth, intoxication, addiction, sleep deprivation, malnutrition, stress,
poverty, and morbidity, under which unconsidered decision-making is particularly likely
(Donohew et al. 2000, Goldman 2012, Mani et al. 2013). By explicitly modelling hetero-
geneous ways-of-thinking, both within and between individuals, the generalised model
provides a rich descriptive theory of such situations. Moreover, since the impulsive deci-
sion criterion predicts purely subconscious responses, the proposed theory applies equally
to situations which the agent need not even identify as a decision problem.
Under Neoclassical decision-theory, individual differences arise as consequences of
heterogeneity in tastes. The generalised model supplements this understanding by ad-
ditionally admitting heterogeneity in thought-processes. That concept has support from
authors in psychology, economics, and decision theory, who have long described human
action as the result of a conflict between decision criteria (e.g. Edwards 1954, Ellsberg
1961, Raiffa 1969). Recent advances in Neuroscience have also been remarkably con-
sistent with this description (Bechara 2005). Furthermore, one might observe that the
tendency of an individual to adopt certain decision criteria manifests their levels of con-
scientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, or openness to experience - thus it underpins
four of psychology’s big five personality traits. Finally I suggest that the fifth trait, neu-
roticism, could be characterised by a lack of consistency and consciousness an individual’s
determination as to which decision criterion should be acted upon.
3 The Dual-Self Literature
3.1 A Generalised Theory of Decision-Making
In order to categorise and compare dual-self modelling approaches, it will be helpful to
first outline a generalised decision framework which nests both dual-self and Neoclassical
models of decision-making. Figure 1 presents this framework as a dynamic game in
extensive form. Each box in Figure 1 represents one possible ‘self’, that is one possible
decision criterion that could be enacted by the agent. In particular, traditional economic
models include just one decision criterion: typically an expected-utility representation of
profit maximisation. Unsurprisingly, dual-self models typically incorporate two possible
decision criteria, although, in principle, the generalised behavioural framework could
accommodate any number of alternative selves.6
In itself, it is not novel for economic theory to incorporate utility components that
represent distinct motivational dimensions. This is common practice in behavioural eco-
nomics. However, it is also common practice to splice those distinct utility components
into a single decision criterion, which requires the imposition of some functional form
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Figure 1: A Generalised Decision Framework
by which those distinct utility dimensions should be traded-off. Within the generalised
framework of Figure 1, such practice assumes that the first stage of an agent’s decision
can be described by some meta-rational expected utility process. We exposed the re-
strictiveness of that assumption in Section 2, but it is nevertheless commonly maintained
outside of the dual-self literature; typically with neither justification nor acknowledge-
ment. The novel contribution of dual-self theory is therefore to explicitly consider how
best to model the interaction between conflicting decision criteria. We refer to outcome
of that interaction as the generalised decision-maker’s state of mind.
Economic dual-self models use one of four approaches to determine their decision-
maker’s state of mind. The models summarised in Table 1 consider that an agent’s state
of mind is determined by the type of decision that she is faced with. An archetype of this
approach is the planner-doer paradigm of Thaler & Shefrin (1981). The models of Table
2 assume an expected-utility meta-rationality, but they do so explicitly and based upon
some specific psychological or neuroscientific description of decision-making. In contrast,
the models of Table 3 adopt a game-theoretic interpretation of the interaction between
alternative decision criteria, by assuming that each self has perfect but incomplete in-
formation. Finally, the models of Table 4 replace any strict assumption over the agent’s
state of mind with a conditional probability distribution over the set of possible decision
criteria. Since those models consider situations with binary outcomes, this can be done
without loss of generality because one or other decision-criterion will necessarily prevail
in such situations.
Although the behavioural literature introduces a great many non-standard motiva-
tions, most dual-self theories describe some instance of the same quintessential human
conflict between reasoned and instinctive actions. Furthermore, most dual-self theories
encode each of those decision criteria into an utility maximisation problem. Neverthe-
less, there is no requirement for each decision criterion to implement Expected Utility
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Theory; for example Bernheim & Rangel (2004) specify a degenerate ‘hot’ decision crite-
rion, wherein an addict will always consume substances. Future research could therefore
seek to incorporate other non-standard decision criteria, such as the Case-Based Decision
Theory of Gilboa & Schmeidler (1995), into the generalised decision framework. Since
there is little inter-model variation in decision criteria, we now structure our taxonomy
and review of the dual-self literature around its alternative approaches toward modelling
the decision-maker’s state of mind.
3.2 A Review of the Economic Dual-self Literature
This section provides a taxonomic review of the economic dual-self literature. Tables
1-4 categorise each model according to its description of the human decision-making
process, outline the situations to which it is applied, and summarise the main behavioural
insights which result from those applications. An exhaustive discussion of each existing
model is not provided, however the key achievements and limitations of each modelling
approach are highlighted, and potential future developments are discussed.
Dual-self models are generally conceived in order provide theoretical explanations
for behaviours which deviate from the predictions of standard economic theory. The
experimental literature has documented many such behaviours, which range from the
incontrovertibly flawed decision-making that arises from misconceptions and misrepre-
sentations, to decisions which seem excessively present-biased, risk-averse, or visceral
when compared with some exogenously defined normative standard. The dual-self liter-
ature addresses each class of normatively suboptimal decision-making through separate
approaches to modelling the decision-maker’s state of mind.
The models of Table 3 address incontrovertibly flawed decision-making. These models
are expressly developed to explore the cognitive implications of imperfect communication
between neurological systems, and they do so by modelling a co-ordination or adversar-
ial game between selves who each possess private information. It is a strength of this
approach that, not only is imperfect information processing a neuroscientific certainty
(Brocas 2012), but its contradiction is intuitively unjustifiable. Furthermore, the models
of Table 3 suggest that the many decision heuristics and biases which arise from miscon-
ceptions or misinterpretations could, in fact, be consequences of imperfect intra-personal
communication. If so, the practical implication is that this class of decision error should
arise consistently, for any individual in any affective state, unless that individual were to
know of their susceptibility and consciously correct for it. Tversky & Kahneman (1974)
provide a concise account of many heuristics and biases which might fall into this class
of decision error, which future research in the spirit of Table 3 might therefore seek to
explain.
The literature summarised in Tables 1 and 2 addresses the separate class of decision-
making that can only be declared suboptimal in comparison to normative economic stan-
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dards. That literature demonstrates that this second class of error could arise as the
natural consequence of a conflict between deliberative and impulsive decision-criteria. Al-
though the theoretical elegance of this explanation does not, in itself, validate it as even
a stylised description of human cognition; authors such as Loewenstein & O’Donoghue
(2005) and Brocas & Carrillo (2008) have derived a compelling case for its validity from
the psychological and neurological literatures. The conflicting selves paradigm evidently
also has intuitive appeal, since it forms the basis of the bestselling books of Kahneman
(2011) and Peters (2012).
In providing a theoretical explanation for the biases of human decision-making, dual-
self models can also explain those actions which might arise as a rational response to
such errors. Indeed, the first dual-self model was created to explain the widespread use of
apparently irrational savings commitment devices, and did so in essence by demonstrating
that they constitute a sophisticated response to present-bias. The insight of Thaler &
Shefrin (1981) was that an economically rational ‘planner’, who is aware that their actions
in future periods will be controlled by a myopic ‘doer’, would optimally seek to constrain
the expenditure of that future self. They envisaged simple rule-of-thumb constraints
for pragmatic reasons, however it was later shown that an expenditure cap would also
be the first-best solution for the ‘planner’ in a wide range of circumstances (Amador,
Werning & Angeletos 2006). Brocas & Carrillo (2008) formally derived present-bias from
this framework, and also demonstrated that the anomalously large correlation between
current income and expenditure could itself represent an efficient rule-of-thumb. The
main criticism of the approach taken by these Table 1 models is that they require a highly
exogenous change in disposition between decisions. Although Gul & Pesendorfer (2001)
elegantly resolve this inconsistency by axiomatising preferences over sets of alternatives,
an elementary alternative resolution is provided by the approach of Table 4. If the
decision-maker’s state of mind is a probability distribution that is conditional upon the
context of a decision, then the myopic ‘doer’ will be active with positive probability in
present period consumption decisions, but indifferent in decisions between exclusively
future alternatives.
It is remarkable that, although we cluster Tables 1 and 3 by their modelling approach,
a taxonomy by implications would produce almost identical categorisations. This obser-
vation suggests that conflicting motivations and imperfect communication between selves
might be important determinants of separate aspects of human behaviour. Only one
existing paper challenges this conclusion – Brocas & Carrillo (2014b) derives decreas-
ing impatience from dual selves with aligned preferences and asymmetric information.
However they require some rather implausible assumptions to achieve this: both of their
dual selves are deliberative, their ‘computation’ system is aware of the entire distribu-
tion of possible future consequences, and their ‘modulation’ system has foreknowledge of
precisely which of those possible consequences will be realised. It would therefore be a
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worthwhile objective for future research to investigate precisely which classes of decision
errors can arise from the existing modelling approaches, under plausible assumption sets.
In contrast Tables 2a, and 2b are so-numbered because they produce comparable
results through conceptually related modelling approaches. The results of Benhabib &
Bisin (2005) and Brocas & Carrillo (2014b) are particularly similar, and when Loewen-
stein, O’Donoghue & Bhatia (2015) of 2b apply their model to temporal inconsistency it
becomes a special case of the Fudenberg & Levine (2006) model of 2a. More significantly,
it should be noted that the rational response to each situation modelled in Tables 1, 2a,
and 2b is formally equivalent to the response generated by some single-self model. In
particular, Loewenstein, O’Donoghue & Bhatia (2015) and Fudenberg & Levine (2006)
derive their models’ single-self equivalent within their respective papers, whilst Dekel,
Lipman & Rustichini (2001) showed that all decisions generated by a model of type 1
can be reproduced by singular preferences over lotteries over sets of alternatives.
One could therefore claim that the models of Table Tables 1, 2a, and 2b merely rep-
resent an alternative interpretation of standard behavioural decision criteria. That claim
is not strictly true. To illustrate, consider the costly willpower paradigm of Loewenstein
& O’Donoghue (2005, 2015), where a rational agent must exert willpower to move away
from their instinctive response towards a deliberative optimum. That framework can
derive decision criteria such as the quasi-hyperbolic discounting of Laibson (1997), the
altruist-egoist trade-off advocated by Becker (1976), or the kantian trade-off proposed by
Alger & Weibull (2013), each of which are usually taken as primitive assumptions. Thus
the costly willpower paradigm can provide an unified derivation for many behavioural
descriptions of human decision-making. This observation is the chief motivation for the
series of papers by Fudenberg and Levine (2006, 2011, 2012, 2014), which develop the
costly willpower paradigm and apply it to explain several prominent decision anomalies.
The derivation of standard behavioural decision criteria through a costly willpower
paradigm does, nevertheless, induce an alternative interpretation of the weighting pa-
rameter. For example, an agent’s apparent overweighting of present consumption would
become a consequence of their rational alleviation of the discomfort of resisting tempta-
tion. This interpretation offers distinct policy implications from the standard interpre-
tation. For instance, Fudenberg & Levine (2012) model an agent with a dynamic stock
of willpower, and Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2005, p.42) discuss factors which could
influence the present level of willpower to conclude that “the rich, who are not confronted
with the constant task of reigning in their desires, are likely to judge the short-sighted
behaviors of the poor too harshly.” Such judgement may be justified under the stan-
dard economic paradigm, which suggests that poverty (at least in advanced economies)
is the just deserts of impatient or lazy decision-making; however that simplistic view is
challenged under the costly willpower paradigm, whereby individuals’ willpower could be
shaped during their childhood and depleted if constantly called upon to complete thank-
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less and mundane tasks at work and at home. Embrey (2017) presents a dual-self model
that develops this insight to explain the observed persistence of multiple dimensions of
social inequality.
The models presented in Embrey (2017) and (Embrey & Kaivanto 2018) are unique in
focussing on the dynamic consequences of decision-making under conflicting motivations,
rather than calculating a rational agent’s optimal response to that framework under the
assumption of perfect self-knowledge. By allowing nature to determine which state of
mind will predominate for any given decision-instance, these models also provides an
economic description of decisions which the agent need not consciously recognise that
they are taking. This heterogeneity in ways-of-thinking is possible since the state of mind
distribution decision criteria is influenced both by an individual’s human nature, and by
the exogenous state of nature – an approach pioneered by Bernheim & Rangel (2004).
This approach provides a descriptive theory of the imperfect and idiosyncratic decision-
making which characterises Homo sapiens, and contrasts with the standard paradigm,
wherein homogeneous agents optimally determine actions in response to some unified
utility maximisation problem.
The models of Tables 1, 2a, and 2b also impose thought-process homogeneity; either
by imposing an exogenous rule for the decision-maker’s state of mind, or by assum-
ing that agents control that first-stage decision through some meta-rational process. In
contrast, the table 4 models of Laibson (2001) and Bernheim & Rangel (2004) explain
many of the stylised facts of addiction through history-dependent utility functions, and
through a stochastic state of mind which determines whether a craving will be triggered.
That stochastic element is, in both cases, designed to capture the concept of cue-driven
addiction, however it could also be interpreted more broadly to describe priming and
framing effects. Interestingly, Bernheim & Rangel (2004, p.1572) stringently reject the
dual-self interpretation of their model on the premise that addicts frequently consider
their actions in an affective ‘hot’ state of craving to be a mistake. Thus, they claim,
those actions cannot be the result of any underlying preferences. This claim contradicts
the concept of revealed preference, and has little philosophical basis: Von Mises (1949)
and even Bentham (1789) declared preferences to be situation-specific, and it is a key
strength of dual-self theory that such specificity can be operationalised7.
The models of Table 4 impose the fewest restrictions on the generalised decision
framework, since circumstances, individuality, and chance are each allowed to influence
the determination as to which decision criterion will predominate. This approach has
two substantial benefits. first, it is the only approach to be compatible with a default-
interventionist interaction between selves (Tables 2a, and 2b, and 3 require parallel pro-
cessing which is rejected by the psychological and neuroscientific evidence – see, for
example Evans & Stanovich (2013), and Bechara (2005)), and second, it provides eco-
nomic theory with the opportunity to explore the implications of heterogeneity in ways-
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of-thinking, and thereby also to describe actions which need not be the result of any
concious decision. Such an approach is, however, under-exploited in the economic liter-
ature, wherein all individual differences are traditionally attributed to heterogeneity in
tastes.
The synopsis in this section has suggested that diverse implementations of the dual-
self paradigm can explain many human deviations from economically rational decision-
making. Mathematically fallacious decision heuristics could arise from imperfect com-
munication between selves, whilst normatively poor decision-making could arise from a
conflict between deliberative and impulsive selves. These two classes of decision error
are currently produced by the distinct modelling approaches of Tables 3 and 1 respec-
tively, however it is a stated aim of many dual-self theorists to work towards an unified
theoretical explanation of human behavioural anomalies (an aim eloquently advocated
in Fudenberg 2006). The present review supports that aim by providing a convenient
summary of the state of art in dual-self modelling, and by deriving a generalised decision
framework which nests much of the dual-self literature.
Under that generalised framework, an agent’s state of mind could be determined ac-
cording to a probability distribution conditional upon circumstances, heterogeneity, and
decision history. Little existing research maintains the full generality of that paradigm,
however this may be a fruitful avenue for future research toward an unified theoretical un-
derstanding of behavioural decision-making. Consider, that if impulsive decision-making:
overweights representativeness, updates imperfectly, and is cued by availability, then
many of the heuristic class of error could be explained. If it also: overweights present
desires, fears the unknown, and is cued by affective state, then many of the normatively
suboptimal class of errors could be explained8. Since impulsive decision-making is, indeed,
commonly attributed with qualities such as these (see, for example, Kahneman 2011),
a generalised implementation of the quintessential human conflict between deliberative
and impulsive reasoning might be shown to explain many of the behavioural anomalies
in human decision-making.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a holistic review of economic dual-self modelling. We find that
the majority of the existing literature seeks to encapsulate the same human conflict be-
tween deliberative and impulsive reasoning, but that the approach taken to modelling
the conflict between those decision criteria varies substantially. In order to taxonomise
the dual-self literature, we therefore present a generalised decision framework in Section
3.1 that nests both Neoclassical and dual-self decision-theory. Existing approaches to-
ward modelling the interaction between conflicting decision criteria include: a simple
context-dependent rule, meta-rationality, game-theoretic interaction, and a conditional
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probability distribution over the set of possible decision criteria. Tables 1-4 summarise
the assumptions and implications of the economic dual-self literature, based upon that
categorisation, and Section 3.2 reviews the main achievements and limitations of each
modelling approach. We conclude that substantial new insights into normatively sub-
optimal decision-making have been gained through the dual-self approach, and that the
disparate strands of the existing literature could potentially be unified under the most
general probabilistic dual-self approach.
Our generalised decision theory extends the standard Neoclassical model by including
an explicit meta-level interaction between decision criteria. Superficially, one might there-
fore suppose that dual-self theory is less parsimonious than the Neoclassical approach.
In fact, the converse is true. Behavioural theories already include multiple utility compo-
nents, but they commonly maintain the assumption that these can be ‘spliced together’
into a single decision criterion with neither justification nor acknowledgement. The meta-
rational dual-self models summarised in Tables 2a and 2b require precisely the same as-
sumption, but they make this explicit and base it upon psychological or neuroscientific
insights. Moreover, the dual-self models of Table 1 and Table 4 require strictly weaker
assumption sets. We provide a thorough comparison of the foundational assumptions of
each approach in Section 2.
Ostensibly, these advances in dual-self decision-theory could constitute a challenge to
the standard Expected Utility paradigm. This is not so. The generalised decision frame-
work described in Section 3 is a strict generalisation of the Neoclassical paradigm, and
moreover it is typically implemented by specifying two alternative utility maximisation
problems. Furthermore, our discussion of the foundational assumptions and implications
of the dual-self generalisation concluded that the Neoclassical approach is ideally suited
to describe any situation which may be characterised by a single clear decision objective.
It is only in ‘behavioural’ situations – those characterised by multiple, conflicting, moti-
vations – that the dual-self generalisation provides greater insight. In such situations, an
as if interpretation of expected utility theory can only describe the outcome of human
decision-making, whereas the generalised approach proposes a descriptive theory of the
decision-making process. Furthermore, the most generalised models admit heterogeneity
in that process, which, given the wide-ranging applications of the literature reviewed
here, may well prove to be an important determinant of individual differences.
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Table 1: Summary of dual-self models where the state of mind is determined by the type
of decision under consideration
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Table 2: Summary of dual-self models where the state of mind is determined by
expected-utility meta-rationality:
Table 2a: Models where the deliberative self manipulates the preferences or information
of the impulsive decision-maker at a cost
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Table 2b: Models where the deliberative self determines behaviour, by moving away
from the impulsive optimum at a cost
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Table 3: Summary of dual-self models where the state of mind is determined by
game-theoretic interaction
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Table 4: Summary of dual-self models with a probabilistic State-of-Mind, conditional
upon: circumstances, heterogeneity, decision-history, ...
Papers Decision-Making Applied to Implications
Laibson (2001)
QJE
(not framed as a
dual-self theory)
Nature determines
which of two states will
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To be populated after double-blind process.
Notes
1. For an exposition of the dual-process paradigm see Kahneman & Frederick (2002); for a review of
psychological theories based upon it see Alo´s-Ferrer & Strack (2014); for a discussion of its neurological
and evolutionary justifications see Cohen (2005).
2. Bentham (1789) is also frequently attributed with the postulates that individuals’ utility valuations ought
to be quantitatively comparable, and that individuals’ experienced utility is identically their decision
utility. Although both of these postulates are problematic, neither is relevant to our present discussion
(which concerns individual agents’ decision utilities), except that the model proposed here does provide
a candidate explanation for the empirical discrepancy between individuals’ predicted and experienced
utilities (see Kahneman, Wakker & Sarin 1997). It should also be noted that the latter attribution is
false.
3. Homo sapiens do, however, have a tendency to supply ex post facto rationalisations for our behaviour
(Loewenstein 1996). That tendency, known to psychologists as hindsight bias, may contribute to the
dominance of the ‘single-self’ paradigm in microeconomic theory.
4. For example: Loewenstein & O’Donoghue (2005) contrast deliberative with affective motivations, Strack
& Deutsch (2004) contrast reflective with impulsive motivations, Bernheim & Rangel (2004) contrast
cold with hot decision criteria, and Thaler & Shefrin (1981) describe a planner and a doer. Though
psychology and neuroscience rightly scrutinise the subtle distinctions between these concepts (See, for
example, Evans 2008), we shall concern ourselves with the substance rather than the nomenclature of
the dual-self literature.
5. For a full theoretical analysis of such decisions see Embrey (2017).
6. Multiple selves are considered by Alonso, Brocas & Carrillo (2014) and by Embrey & Kaivanto (2018).
7. Nothing in Bernheim and Rangel’s otherwise compelling paper relies on this claim; it is merely a conve-
nience which removes the need to justify the use of ‘cold’ preferences as a welfare criterion.
8. It is interesting to observe that xenophobia – accurately ‘fear of the unknown’ – could underpin not only
risk aversion, but also present-bias, habit-formation, and discrimination.
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